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INTRODUCTION 
The Beckers make unjustified assumptions and attempt to segregate their acts in an effort to 
relieve themselves from liability. Despite the fact that the Beckers' affirmative representations did 
not give any indication that the source of irrigation water was different than the house water and no 
indication that the Beckers had no right to that source, the Beckers argue that their representations 
were not false or misleading. This fact is so important that it warrants being repeated-there is no 
indication in any of the Beckers' representations that the irrigation water came from a different well 
than the house water or that the Humphrieses were not purchasing rights to that well. 
The Statement of Facts presented in the Appellant's Brief is incorporated herein by this 
reference. Those facts will be supplemented with those presented below in the Argument section. 
For convenience, "Property" means the property that was transferred from Eileen Becker to the 
Humphrieses, "Shared Well" means the well on Allen and Jane's property which provides water to 
the Property under the Joint Well Use Agreement, and "Farm Well" is the well on the neighboring 
farm that is connected to the sprinkler system on the Property. 
ARGUMENT 
The Beckers make various assumptions and pass those off as facts in support of their 
position. The very fact that those assumptions are in dispute underscores the Humphrieses' 
assertion that there remain unresolved questions of fact that should have precluded the district 
court from entering summary judgment. 
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A. The Beckers' creative representation is misleading and false. 
In their brief, the Beckers argue that the representations were not false because the 
sprinkler water on the subject property was in fact provided by a "private" source that was a 
"shared" well, because the Farm Well was private and shared. However, whether a 
representation could be contorted so as to render it technically accurate does not mean it was not 
false or misleading in the context in which the representation was made. 
In order to take their position, the Beckers require this Court to assume that the 
representations necessarily refer to the Farm Well. At least two of the Beckers' representations 
must be scrutinized in this respect. The first representation is on the Listing, where under 
"Water," it states, "Shared Well." R. 101. It also states, on that same document, "Well shared 
with Becker home to the south on agreement being drawn." Id. The second representation is on 
the RE-25 Seller's Property Condition Disclosure Form (the "Disclosure") where it states that 
the irrigation water is provided by a "Private System." R. 105. 
Reading these two statements together, it is not unreasonable for a person to conclude 
that the only source of water to the Property is the Shared Well, when, in fact, the Farm Well was 
supplying the Property's irrigation water. Neither of these two statements contain any indication 
that the irrigation water is actually connected to a source other than the Shared Well. Indeed, the 
Listing indicates that there is only one source of water. It does not say "Shared Wells"; It says 
"Shared Well." The use of the singular indicates one source of water and cannot be "technically 
true" where there are actually two sources of water to the Property. 
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Considering that on appeal, the Court is to "liberally construe the facts in the existing 
record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in 
favor of the nonrnoving party," this Court should hold that there exists a genuine issue of fact 
than renders summary judgment inappropriate. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 
179,731 P.2d 171, 174(1986). 
B. The representations did not refer to the Farm Well but the Shared Well. 
The Beckers assert that the representations were not false because the irrigation water 
came from the Farm Well and the Farm Well was "shared" and "private." However, the evidence 
indicates that the Beckers were not speaking of the Farm Well when making their 
representations. 
The Beckers enlisted the help of Sheila Adams, a realtor, to sell the Property. R. MD. 3, L. 
3-5, R. 257, P. 55, L. 10-25, P. 56, L. 1-3. During the listing and sale process, Allen and Jane 
Becker also acted as "middlemen" and representatives of Eileen. R. MD. 3, L. 4--5. R. 80, L. 21-25, 
R. 81, 1-1 l. The Beckers provided information to Ms. Adams in order to list the Property for sale. 
R. MD. 3, L. 4--5, R. 78-81, 92. Specifically, Ms. Adams testified that the Beckers told her that 
when Allen and Jane owned the Property, they would use the Farm Well but that the use would not 
continue because the Beckers did not have a right to it. R. 379, L. 1-16, R. 472, L. 20-22, R. 473, L. 
1-5. The Beckers represented to Ms. Adams that the Shared Well could provide water to the 
Property's yard, so long as everything else was not turned on at the same time. R. 473, L. 5-7, R. 
492, L. 15-18. Ms. Adams understood from the Beckers' characterizations of the sources of water, 
that the water from the Farm Well had been merely supplementary and was not necessary to meet 
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the Property's water needs. R. 718, L. 15-22. Ms. Adams also believed, based upon the Beckers' 
representations, that the Shared Well was connected to the sprinklers and the source for the 
irrigation water. R. 497, L. 4-9. Based upon the Beckers' representations, Ms. Adams understood 
that there was only one source of water, the Shared Well, for the entire Property. R. 490, L. 2-17. 
The Beckers' representations to Ms. Adams, which were communicated by Ms. Adams to 
prospective buyers in the Listing and the Disclosure, were referring to the Shared Well-that the 
Shared Well was the source of all water to the property-and not the Farm Well. Whether or not the 
representations are "technically true" because of the characteristics of the Farm Well is irrelevant 
because the representations actually referred to the Shared Well. 
At the very least, there are conflicting inferences that may be drnwn as to what source of 
water the representations referred. If conflicting inferences can be drawn from the evidence and 
reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Ashby v. 
Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979). "All doubts are to be resolved against the 
moving party .... " G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1990). 
C. Significant issues of material fact remain unresolved. 
Two very important issues of material fact remain. First, there remains a question of fact 
as to what representations were made. The Beckers impliedly assert that their representations 
refer to the Farm Well, despite any disclosure of the existence of the Farm Well. In fact, the 
Beckers' own agent admitted that there was no way for any prospective buyer to know about the 
Farm Well from the documents she prepared based on their representations. R. 494, L. 17-20. 
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Such an assertion is also contradicted by the testimony of Ms. Adams who indicates that those 
representations refer to the Shared Well. 
At a minimum, the Beckers' representations were ambiguous as to which source of water 
they referred. A representation is ambiguous as a matter of law when it is subject to multiple, 
reasonable interpretations. See Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P .3d 1036 (2008) (holding 
that the question of whether an instrument is ambiguous is a question of law and that an 
instrument is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation). "Ambiguity in a 
representation presents questions of fact for determination by the jury as to the meaning of the 
statement, and the meaning which the person making intended it should convey to the person to 
whom it was made." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 59. The actual meaning of the 
representations is ambiguous and a question of fact. 
Second, once the meanings of the representations are determined, then there is, at the 
very minimum, a question of fact as to the truthfulness of the representations. If the 
representations refer to the Farm Well, then a question remains as to how affim1ative 
representations could be made about the Farm Well without giving any indication that the Farm 
Well exists. There also exists a question of fact as the Listing only refers to one "Shared Well" 
and there would be two wells involved. If the representations refer to the Shared Well, then there 
is no question of fact because there is no evidence that irrigation water is supplied by the Shared 
Well. Either way, summary judgment in favor of the Beckers was inappropriate. 
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D. The Beckers knew that their representations were not true. 
The evidence shows that the Beckers knew that there were two sources of water to the 
Property. They were fully aware that the water to the house was from the Shared Well and the 
water to the sprinklers was from the Farm Well. R. 82, L. 25, R. 83, L. 1-7. Therefore, whether 
this element is fulfilled or not depends upon how the trier of fact determines the meaning of the 
representations as outlined above. If the jury determines that the representations refer to the 
Shared Well, then the representation is false and the Beckers knew it was false as they knew that 
the irrigation water came from the Farm Well, not the Shared Well. 
The Beckers argue that this Court should affirm summary judgment because the 
knowledge element was not argued in the Humphrieses' opening brief. This argument fails for 
two reasons. 
First, the District Court did not make its determination based upon the knowledge 
element. A full reading of the District Court's decision shows that it based its decision on 
whether the representation was false. The pertinent section is entitled, "B. The Beckers Did Not 
Make Any False Representations, and Complied With Any Duty to Disclose They May Have 
Had." MD at 6. The paragraph the Beckers cite to states, in full: 
There are two representations prior to closing that might be attributed to the 
Beckers concerning the source of irrigation water. The first appears on the 
property condition disclosure form. The form contains areas for a seller of a 
property to indicate the source of domestic water as well as the source of 
irrigation water. There are only four potions on the form for the seller to indicate 
the source of the water. The Beckers placed checkmarks in boxes under the 
heading "private system", indicating that domestic water was provided by a 
private system, and that irrigation water was provided by a private system. The 
evidence in the record indicates that the Beckers believed that this was true, and 
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that both domestic and irrigation water were provided by a private system. The 
irrigation water was provided by the farm well, which was private. It could also 
be provided by the domestic well. There is no evidence that the source of the 
irrigation water is anything but a private system. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that Allen Becker believed the domestic well could be connected to the sprinkler 
system, and that it could provide enough water for the system, even if the water 
pressure would not be ideal. See Deposition of Sheila Adams, 47: 12018; 
Deposition of Allen Becker, 37:8017. Therefore this representation was not made 
with the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, nor was the representation false. To 
sustain a fraud claim, a party must prove both a false representation and the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity. Country Cove Development, Inc. v .. May, 143 
Idaho 595, 600, 150 P.3d 288, 293 (2006). The representation was neither false, 
nor was it knowingly false. 
MD. at 7. The section then addresses the other representation which is found in the Listing. 
However, the District Court makes no reference to the knowledge element regarding that 
representation. Finally, the District Court concludes the section: 
The Beckers did not make any false representations concerning the source of 
irrigation water. Furthermore, the Joint Use Well Agreement was sufficient 
disclosure of the source of irrigation water to satisfy any duty of disclosure the 
Beckers may have had. Because of this the Humphries are unable to maintain a 
claim against the Beckers for fraud concerning the source of irrigation water. 
MD. at 9-10. 
The only place m which the knowledge element was discussed with regards to the 
Disclosure. It was not discussed as to the other representation that was made. It was not 
addressed in the section heading. Most importantly, it was not addressed in the conclusion of the 
section wherein the District Court explicitly stated that its reasons for its decision were that there 
were no false representations and the Joint Use Well Agreement satisfied any duty to disclose. 
The District Court did not state the knowledge element as one of the reasons for its decision. 
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Second, the knowledge element is inherently dependent upon the falsity element when 
the falsity element is determined to be dispositive. For example, a person cannot know that a 
false statement is false if it is determined that the statement was not false. Here, the District 
Court determined that the statement was not false and therefore the Beckers could not know that 
it was false. The crux of the decision, then, is based upon whether the representations were 
false-not whether the speakers knew it was false. 
E. The Joint Well Use Agreement did not cure any duty to disclose. 
The Beckers argue that the Joint Well Use Agreement cured any duty to disclose because 
it refers to "domestic purposes." However, this argument makes and relies upon an unjustified 
assumption. A duty to disclose arises in situations where an additional disclosure is necessary "to 
prevent a partial statement of the facts from being misleading." Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 
702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245, 1250 (2000). 
To begin, the Beckers' representations were, at the minimum, misleading. The Beckers 
made affirmative representations about the sources of water to the Property and gave absolutely 
no indication that the irrigation water came from a different source, much less a source to which 
the Property and Beckers had no rights. To overcome the misleading representations, the Beckers 
argue that the Joint Well Use Agreement provided sufficient disclosure. 
The Joint Well Use Agreement was not a disclosure, gave no indication that the irrigation 
water came from a different source, and gave no indication that the Beckers had no rights in the 
irrigation water source. R. 185-188. The Beckers argue that the Humphries should have come to 
the conclusion about the true nature of the water sources by the use of the term "domestic 
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purposes" in the Joint Well Use Agreement because that term is "clearly defined by Idaho law." 
Resp'ts' Brief, at 27. The Beckers cite to Idaho Code § 42-111(1) to provide that definition. 
Without explanation, the Beckers omit that § 42-111 's express limitation in its recitation. Idaho 
Code § 42-111(1) begins, "For the purposes of sections 42-221, 42-227, 42-230, 42-235, 42-
237a, 42-242, 42-243, and 42-1401A, Idaho Code, the phrase 'domestic purposes' or 'domestic 
uses' means: .... " Nothing therein indicates that it controls as the definition of "domestic 
purposes" anytime that phrase is used in this state. There is no indication in the Shared Well 
Agreement that the definition contained in Idaho Code § 42-111 (1) was incorporated by the 
document. In fact, the entire document is devoid of any reference to the Idaho Code. 
Additionally, there is a question of fact concerning the size of the portion of the Property 
to be irrigated. While the Property itself is one acre, there are multiple improvements situated 
thereon that take up a considerable portion of the Property. Thus, there remains a question of fact 
as to the size of the ground to irrigate. 
There was no indication that would prompt the Humphries to look to Idaho Code to 
determine whether the Beckers were curing any previous misrepresentations by using the term 
"domestic purposes" in the Joint Well Use Agreement. The meaning of the term "domestic 
purposes" is subject to multiple, reasonable interpretations and is, therefore, ambiguous. See 
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P .3d 1036 (2008) (holding that the question of whether an 
instrument is ambiguous is a question of law and that an instrument is ambiguous if it is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations). "Ambiguity in a representation presents 
questions of fact for determination by the jury as to the meaning of the statement, and the 
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meaning which the person making intended it should convey to the person to whom it was 
made." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit§ 59. Thus, whether the Joint Well Use Agreement was 
sufficient to cure the previously-made misrepresentations is a question of fact for the jury to 
decide. Accordingly, with reasonable inferences from the record are to be drawn in favor of the 
Humphrieses, the district court erred in granting summary judgment . See Anderson v. City of 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 P.2d 171, 174 (1986). 
F. The Beckers violated the Property Condition Disclosure Act. 
The Beckers argue that they adequately disclosed the source of water to the Property, 
thereby fulfilling their obligations under the Property Condition Disclosure Act. However, this 
argument fails for two reasons. First, one of the purposes of the Property Condition Disclosure 
Act is to disclose to prospective buyers the source of water to the property to be purchased. That 
way, prospective buyers will be able to make an informed decision concerning the purchase of 
the property. Despite the Beckers' multiple representations, there was absolutely no indication 
that the irrigation water came from the Farm Well. All indications were that it came from the 
Shared Well, particularly when the disclosure is read in conjunction with the Listing. The 
disclosure cannot be adequate if it does not clearly disclose all of the sources of water to the 
property. 
Second, there remains an issue of fact as to whether the Beckers' claim that they were 
limited to five options and chose the best one, "private." The Beckers' own realtor, Ms. Adams, 
testified that if the Beckers were upfront with the actual water source situation, the correct option 
would have been "other." See R. 509, L. 13-18. Such a disclosure would have given the 
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Humphrieses and their realtor notice not only that the source for the irrigation water was 
different than the Shared Well, which would have prompted them to investigate that source and 
the rights being transferred. 
The Beckers argue that the Humphrieses are attempting to expand the requirements of the 
Property Condition Disclosure Act "to include a narrative to detail the delivery system attendant 
to each type of water, and whether there are multiple systems to the Property or whether it is all 
on one system." Resp'ts' Brief, at 30. This allegation is untrue. All the Humphries expect is that 
the purpose of the Property Condition Disclosure Act-that to provide accurate information on 
the sources of water-be fulfilled. In this case, that would require, at most, mentioning that the 
irrigation water source was different than the house water and that the sellers had no rights to 
that source. 
The underlying assumption in a property disclosure is that the representations of water 
sources therein are being transferred with the property being sold. When the irrigation water 
source is listed as "Private," the potential buyers can reasonably assume not only that the 
irrigation water source is actually private, but that the sellers have rights to that private water 
source. Again, considering all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the Humphries, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 179, 731 
P.2d 171,174 (1986). 
G. There remains an issue of fact concerning the sprinklers. 
The Beckers argue that there was no evidence in the record creating an issue of fact in 
regards to whether the misrepresentation regarding the sprinklers was material. It should be 
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noted that the Beckers do not challenge the fact that the information about the sprinklers was 
actually false. In fact, there is no evidence that the Beckers did not make a false representation 
regarding the sprinkler system. The only challenge as to whether that particular false 
representation was material. "The materiality of a misrepresentation is not a matter for the trial 
court but for the fact-finder." Ellis v. Liter, 841 S.W.2d 155, 156 (Ark. 1992). "To prove 
materiality of a misrepresentation, it is only necessary to show the misrepresented fact was a 
material influence on the decision; it must have been a substantial factor, but it is not necessary 
that it was the paramount or decisive inducement. This is a question of fact for the fact-finder." 
Id. (italics in original). 
The Beckers rely heavily on the District Court's findings with regards to the materiality 
element of the sprinklers. The Beckers state, "Robert [Humphries] also filed an affidavit simply 
stating that the issue of the automation of the sprinklers was material to the Humphries. On this 
evidence, the District Court found it: 'unpersuasive because it amounts to a bare denial of 
arguments made by Becker in their Motion for Summary Judgment.. .. '" Resp'ts' Brief, at 23 
(citing R. at 700). 
Reliance upon the District Court's decision as to Robert's testimony is inappropriate for 
two reasons. First, the District Court effectively disregarded Robert's testimony as nonevidence. 
Testimony is evidence. If such were not the case, then the landscape of all litigation would 
dramatically change. Second, the District Court impermissibly weighed the evidence by finding 
that Robert's testimony was "unpersuasive." The "weighing of evidence and a determination of a 
witness's credibility .. .is improper in a motion for summary judgment." Hines v. Hines, 129 
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Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997). In fact, sworn testimony at the summary judgment stage 
"must be considered truthful." Meridian Bowling Lanes, Inc. v. Meridian Athletic Ass 'n, Inc., 
105 Idaho 509, 512 670 P.2d 1294, 1297 (1983). 
Whether Robert's testimony is self-serving is a credibility determination that must be left 
for the jury, but testimony by a party is generally self-serving and being such does not render it 
non-evidentiary. Additionally, despite the Beckers' and the District Court's assertions, Robert's 
self-serving testimony that he would not have purchased the house or offered significantly less 
for it had he known the truth of the water sources and the sprinklers (R. 458, L. 23, R. 459, L. 1-
3) is supported by other evidence. As noted in the Appellants' Brief, the Humphrieses 
renegotiated a lower price for other issues that were discovered as deficient or unsafe after 
having the inspection R. 231, L. 18-25, R. 232, L. 1--6. 
The Beckers argue that the relatively low cost to fix the sprinklers undermines Robert's 
testimony. Such an argument does not take into consideration how a layperson may view a sprinkler 
system. It is reasonable that a person who is unfamiliar with the installation of, operation of, and 
costs to repair sprinklers may place much more importance on whether a sprinkler system is 
automatic than a person who is more knowledgeable. That layperson may value a fully automatic 
sprinkler system into the thousands of dollars or be completely put off by a property that did not 
have a fully automatic sprinkler system. It is precisely because of these types of issues that the 
materiality of a false representation presents a question of fact best left for the fact-finder to decide, 
not the court. 
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The Beckers also argue that the sprinklers could not have been material because the 
Humphrieses did not file that claim shortly after discovering that fact. If the amount of time between 
discovery of a claim and the filing of that claim was used as evidence as to whether a false 
representation was material, then the entire concept of materiality would change. However, just 
because the Humphrieses are not overly excited to initiate litigation, does not mean that the issue 
was not material to them. 
The District Court erred by invading the province of the jury in that regard. 
H. The representations in the Listing and the Disclosure were the Beckers' 
Representations. 
In their brief, the Beckers attempt to piecemeal the representations and the roles of each 
actor in an apparent attempt to segregate Jane, Allen, Eileen, and Ms. Adams and undermine an 
element of fraud on each of them. However, Jane, Allen, Eileen, and Ms. Adams were working in 
concert to provide the representations to potential buyers and therefore the Beckers cannot evade 
being liable for those representations. 
Eileen was the seller of the Property. Having not lived there, she relied heavily on Jane and 
Allen to provide the information for the Property to Ms. Adams. Jane and Allen were authorized to 
speak to Ms. Adams on Eileen's behalf. R. 80-81. As such, Jane and Allen were agents of Eileen 
for the purpose of the sale of the Property. As agents, their false statements and their knowledge of 
false statements are imputed to Eileen, their principal. Allen v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 14 Idaho 728, 
95 P. 829 (1908) (stating that the false statements and knowledge of those false statements of an 
agent is imputed to the agent's company); see also J.J Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 11 P.2d 
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966, 967 (1932) (holding that a principal seller "who retains benefits derived from the fraudulent 
conduct of his agent" cannot evade liability for the fraudulent conduct even if the seller 
previously forbade such conduct). All representations made by Eileen, Allen, and Jane were 
made with the knowledge that Ms. Adams would communicate that information to potential 
buyers. 
Ms. Adams then used the information provided by the Beckers in drafting the Listing and 
Disclosure. There is no indication that Ms. Adams took any liberty with the information given to 
her by the Beckers and, in fact, communicated exactly what the Beckers represented to her 
regarding the water sources. 
The Beckers' combined involvement in the sale of the property was so intertwined that 
Allen was the signor of the Joint Well Use Agreement that was promised in the Listing. See R. 
101, 188. 
The representations made by Ms. Adams were the representations made by the Beckers. 
The representations made by Jane and Allen and the knowledge of their truthfulness are imputed 
to Eileen. The Beckers cannot evade liability by segregating each actor, each actor's statements, 
and each actor's knowledge. 
I. Alternative grounds do not justify affirming summary judgment. 
1. The Beckers are liable for the representations. 
The Beckers argue that the District Court's determination should be affirmed because the 
Beckers are not liable for their agent's MLS listing. This argument fails for two reasons. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - Page 15 
First, the Beckers should be held liable for the Listing. The Beckers cite Idaho Code § 54-
2093(1 ), which states, 
A client, as defined in this chapter, whether buyer or seller, shall not be liable for 
a wrongful act, error, omission or misrepresentation of his broker or his broker's 
licensees unless the client had actual knowledge of or reasonably should have 
known of the wrongful act, error, omission or misrepresentation. 
(Emphasis added). The Beckers emphasize the italicized words. However, those italicized words 
are ineffectual if the bold portion is triggered. In this case, there is a genuine issue of fact 
concerning whether the Beckers knewor should have known of Ms. Adams' s "wrongful act, 
error, omission or misrepresentation." As explained above, it was the Beckers that provided Ms. 
Adams with the information that she used to complete the Listing and the Disclosure-including 
that the Shared Well supplied the irrigation water and that the Farm Well would not be used 
anymore despite their knowledge to the contrary. There is evidence that the information that the 
Beckers provided to Ms. Adams was false and that they knew it was false. If these facts are 
proven, the Beckers cannot avoid liability for Ms. Adams's use of that information. 
Second, even if the Beckers are not liable for the Listing, they are still liable for the 
misrepresentation contained in the RE-25 Property Listing Disclosure Form-on which they did 
not provide any indication or hint that the irrigation water came from the Farm Well or that the 
Property had no rights to that water. Those representations came from the Beckers directly, not 
through their realtor. 
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2. The Beckers knew the sprinkler representation was false. 
The Beckers attempt to avoid liability by claiming that Eileen did not know that the 
sprinklers were not actually fully automatic. However, Jane and Allen operated as "middlemen" 
between Eileen and the Ms. Adams, supplying much of the information. Eileen relied upon them 
to give much of this information. As such, Jane and Allen were agents of Eileen in giving the 
information and they knew that the information being provided about the sprinklers was false. 
As explained above, the false statements and knowledge of an agent are imputed to the principal. 
Allen v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 14 Idaho 728, 95 P. 829 (1908). Accordingly, regardless of whether 
Eileen herself had personal knowledge concerning the sprinkler system is not dispositive in itself 
if Allen and/or Jane had such knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the Beckers' representations concerning the source of water to the Property gave 
any indication that they had no right to convey the source of the irrigation water. The evidence in 
the record is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether those representations 
were false and the Beckers' knowledge of the falsity of those statements. Additionally, the Beckers 
made false statements regarding the functionality of the sprinkler system. Therefore, summary 
judgment was inappropriate and the Humphrieses ask this Court to reverse the District Court's 
decision and remand this case so that it may be tried before a jury. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-Page 17 
DATED this 14th day of October, 2014. 
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WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, P.L.L.C. 
By: ~/:;j?_r~---·· -
K~1A. MELTON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 14th day of October, 2014, he caused two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
Brooke B. Redmond 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC 
P.O. Box 226 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
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(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(208) 523-9518 
